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Until the early twentieth century, Americans generally responded to the risk of
floods by building protective levees. By the late 1800s, this approach was firmly
entrenched in federal policy. Because of the singular focus on levees, floods actually
became more severe, with a prime example occurring in 1927. The floods of 1927
demonstrated that levees-only was an untenable policy, but a new approach to managing
flood risk took several decades to fully materialize. The geographer Gilbert Fowler White
played a central role in developing the nation’s new approach to floods. In his 1945
doctoral dissertation, White laid out a multi-faceted approach to flood risks that promoted
the accommodation of nature at times, rather than relying exclusively on ever-greater
works of engineering to address the risk of flood. The passage of the National Flood
Insurance Act in 1968 demonstrates the acceptance of White’s ideas into federal policy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The state of Iowa had been hit by heavy rainfall throughout early June 2008, yet
few people saw any reason for concern. On the evening of June 7, a Saturday, the
showers relented for a few hours, allowing thousands of people to enjoy an outdoor
concert in downtown Iowa City, a few blocks away from the Iowa River. Things changed
quickly, though. Within a matter of days, many of those formerly carefree concertgoers
were fighting to save their personal possessions, if not their lives. The Iowa River,
already high on June 7, continued to rise, much more rapidly than forecasters had
predicted. By the 9th and 10th of June, residents were ordered to evacuate certain areas of
the city. These generally low-lying locales had been presumed high enough to be at an
insignificant risk for flooding. Nonetheless, the waters came to Iowa City, as to many
cities throughout the Midwest. By June 13, the Iowa River crested the spillway of the
Coralville Reservoir, just upstream from Iowa City, further increasing water levels in
town. The University of Iowa shut down, and the city was almost bisected, as nearly
every bridge across the river in the metropolitan area was closed. Once the waters
receded, losses within the region were estimated to reach well into the billions. With the
floodwaters, and the economic losses, came questions. How do people decide which
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places are safe for inhabitation, and which places are too likely to be flooded? How
should floodplains be defined? Should they be protected?1
Water is an important element of the natural world, and it has certainly not gone
unnoticed by historians. When people struggle with water, they generally have one of two
purposes in mind: providing it when it is in short supply, or keeping it at bay when it is
overly abundant. The former objective has inspired a healthy body of work, focused
largely on the campaign to irrigate the American West.2 The latter aim, clearly the one on
the minds of Iowa Citians in the summer of 2008, has also received some attention,
though its historiography is not as thorough. Historians have scrutinized the way flood
control changed over the nineteenth and into the twentieth century.3 They have
investigated specific incidents such as the disastrous floods of 1927.4 Less examined has

1

The author was present during the flooding in Iowa City in June, 2008, and details are
drawn from personal experience. Newspapers such as the Iowa City Press-Citizen, the
Cedar Rapids Gazette, and the Des Moines Register provided thorough coverage of the
flooding and are excellent sources for further information.
2
Pioneering works in the historiography of western irrigation include Samuel Hays’
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959) and Donald Worster’s Rivers of Empire:
Water, Aridity, and the Growth of the American West (New York: Pantheon Books,
1985). Other important books in the field include Marc Reisner’s Cadillac Desert: The
American West and Its Disappearing Water (New York: Viking, 1986), Donald Pisani’s
Water and American Government: The Reclamation Bureau, National Water Policy, and
the West, 1902-1935 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), and Mark Fiege’s
Irrigated Eden: The Making of an Agricultural Landscape in the American West (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1999).
3
For examples, see Jamie W. Moore and Dorothy P. Moore, The Army Corps of
Engineers and the Evolution of Federal Flood Plain Management Policy (Boulder, Colo:
Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1989) and Martin Reuss,
Designing the Bayous: The Control of Water in the Atchafalaya Basin 1800-1995
(Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1998)
4
Leading works on the Mississippi floods of 1927 include John M. Barry, Rising Tide:
The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How it Changed America (New York: Simon &
2

been the way that the mentality behind flood control in the United States has changed.
“Disasters and serious accidents are always evidence of bad engineering,” hydrological
innovator James Eads stated in 1874, implying by his statement that with perfectly
executed engineering, losses caused by wayward waters could be fully eliminated.5
Today, such a statement seems dubious at best, if not downright naïve. Knowledgeable
observers no longer accept the idea that bodies of water can be fully subdued by the
efforts of humans. Sometimes, we now know, people must accommodate the ebbs and
flows of the natural world. This shift in thinking was catalyzed by the federal
government’s entry into floodplain management, and by its decision to place its faith in
levees, perhaps the most brazenly domineering tool humans bring to the table in their
efforts to negotiate relationships with Earth’s bodies of water.
An important transformation in the way Americans relate to the risk of floods has
taken place in the past century. In earlier years, the dominant view equated rivers with
wild beasts that must be tamed to further human progress. The wilder the beast, the
greater the renown one could earn by taming it. Nature, however, has a way of belittling
mankind’s hubris. In 1912, the “unsinkable” Titanic met her match when she tangled
with an iceberg on her maiden voyage. Fifteen years later, an analogous event ripped
through the hull of confidence that characterized the American belief that flooding could
be conquered, if humans could but summon the requisite collective willpower. For nearly
half a century, the federal government had dictated that levees—embankments meant to

Schuster, 1997) and Pete Daniel, Deep'n As It Come: The 1927 Mississippi River Flood
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977).
5
Barry 75
3

constrain streams within their courses—were the only tool necessary to keep raging
floodwaters at bay. The Mississippi River Commission, the governmental agency charged
with fortifying the banks of America’s rivers, imposed building standards for levees that
would contain deluges greater than any in the historical record. By the mid-1920s, the
MRC had finally declared that the levee systems on major American rivers were up to its
standards. Like the unsinkable Titanic, the bulwarks were impregnable. In 1927,
however, an inundation like none previously known afflicted the Mississippi valley.
Waters rose to unprecedented heights, and just as the iceberg had sliced through the hull
of the Titanic, the Mississippi River ripped gaping holes in its artificial constraints. In one
blow, the raging currents had washed away the idea that the Mississippi’s levees were
impermeable, and the magnitude of the flooding was such that it would have been foolish
to suggest that the MRC simply needed to adjust its standards to require sturdier
construction.
Americans had been fortifying their riverbanks well before 1927. Their efforts
were not always successful, but the MRC’s high standards were meant to change that.
The MRC did not fully account, however, for the effects of constricting the flow of many
of the nation’s major rivers. In earlier days, levees had been haphazardly built and
maintained by individuals, local and state governments, and commercial interests. These
disparate factions had never managed to fully link their protective works. Because of the
sporadic nature of this older levee system, excess waters were always able to find places
to escape their banks reducing the volume of water in the main channels. The federal
government, however, had the resources and the authority to create a gapless system.
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Once the full levee system was in place, no exit valves remained. The floodwaters of
1927, unable to spread lazily onto surrounding bottomlands, rose and rose, finally
building up so much pressure that they pulverized mankind’s stoutest efforts to contain
them.
With federal support, America’s riparian fortifications were built up to such an
extent that sooner or later, a catastrophe such as that of 1927 was inevitable. In the wake
of the overrun banks and inundated bottomlands, planners were left to ponder a new way
forward. After nearly half a century of remaining relatively static, flood control policy in
the United States began to undergo a transformation that would take nearly as long. No
single individual had a greater influence on this transformation than geographer Gilbert
Fowler White. Born in 1911, White was a mere teenager during the calamities of 1927,
not yet involved in the debate over floodplain management. He entered the arena when he
joined the New Deal bureaucracy in 1933, interrupting his graduate studies at the
University of Chicago. White spent the next nine years working on issues of flooding and
water control. In 1942 he completed his doctoral dissertation, a work that analyzed
numerous ways to adjust to floods, and that would become deeply influential as it became
better known. The essence of White’s dissertation is his assertion that a multi-faceted
approach will produce the greatest reduction in flood damages, and that in their dealings
with water, people must look beyond modifying the environment. In many instances,
White argued, optimal results will be achieved when people adapt their behaviors in
relation to flood risks, rather than relying only on their ability to manipulate their
surroundings. Though White is well known in the field of geography, his renown among
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historians is not nearly as great. Robert Hinshaw’s Living with Nature’s Extremes is a
general biography of White, and geographer Rutherford Platt has effectively surveyed
White’s contributions to floodplain management.6 Neither Hinshaw nor Platt has fully
analyzed White in relation to the historical currents that surrounded him—which is not to
be taken as a criticism of either scholar, as neither is a trained historian.
Perhaps no event better illustrates the adoption of White’s ideas by federal
policymakers than the 1968 passage of the National Flood Insurance Act. In his
dissertation, White identified flood insurance as a means of adjusting to the
unpredictability of riparian landscapes. At the time of his writing, however, financial
protection from inundations was not widely available in the United States. Private
insurers had reached the conclusion that floods were uninsurable, a situation that White
was aware of. Because only certain areas are prone to high waters, only those people who
own property in those areas are likely to purchase flood insurance, preventing the risk
from being spread across a large pool. That might not be a fatal problem if insurance
claims were small, but unexpected torrents can cause immense damages. For an insurance
program to be self-sustaining, the premiums of many policyholders must cover the losses
of a few victims, but in the case of floods, only a small portion of the potential risk pool
is likely to purchase coverage, and among those who would purchase it, the likelihood of
major losses is high.

6

Robert Hinshaw, Living with Nature’s Extremes: The Life of Gilbert Fowler White
(Boulder, Colo: Johnson Books, 2006), Rutherford Platt, “Floods and Man: A
Geographer’s Agenda,” in Robert Kates and Ian Burton (eds.), Geography, Resources,
and Environment, Volume II: Themes from the Work of Gilbert F. White (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1986).
6

White’s vision of flood insurance was not simply the creation of a federal subsidy
for those who choose to live in low-lying areas. Rather, he envisioned a program that
would include incentives to encourage wiser usage of areas near to bodies of water. This
idea came to fruition in the National Flood Insurance Act. Among the stipulations of the
act were that no policies were to be written for buildings that were in violation of local or
state floodplain zoning ordinances, and after an adjustment period of two years, no
insurance was to be offered at all in communities that had not enacted measures to restrict
building in places where water damage was likely.
This study is divided into three parts. The second chapter surveys the
development of flood control systems from the colonial era through the New Deal era.
The third chapter introduces Gilbert White and his ideas, and charts the broadening
acceptance of those ideas among his professional colleagues. Chapter four details the
acceptance of White’s ideas into federal policy, focusing especially on the creation of the
National Flood Insurance Program.
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CHAPTER 2
FLOOD CONTROL POLICY THROUGH THE NEW DEAL
In order to fully appreciate the changes in American flood policies that took place
in the mid twentieth century, described in the following chapters, it is necessary to have
some understanding of the developments that took place in earlier years. This chapter
traces the shift of flood control efforts in the United States from a responsibility of
individuals, corporations, local, and state governments to a function of the federal
government. When flood control was a non-federal responsibility, it was largely selfregulating—these smaller entities worked independently on relatively small projects and
would not undertake efforts that exceeded their narrow self-interest. The dominant
mindset ordained conquering nature, and when restricted by the limits of individual
ability, this often worked as a means of keeping rising waters at bay. Even as the federal
government gradually took a more active role in floodplain management, a mentality of
conquest prevailed. The size of federal flood projects grew bigger and bigger from the
1890s through the 1920s, however, and this theory of land manipulation proved
increasingly problematic. The government undertook projects exponentially larger than
any on record, which meant both positive and negative outcomes were magnified. Many
of these federal flood control projects proved to be costly and dangerous flops. In the

8

aftermath of the catastrophic inundations of 1927, it became painfully clear that bigger
and better flood control projects did not always provide bigger and better results.
Among American rivers that have wreaked havoc by overflowing their banks,
none loom larger than the Mississippi. The second longest river in the United States (only
the Missouri, a tributary of the Mississippi, is longer), and the largest by discharge, the
Mississippi has occupied a unique spot in the nation’s consciousness since the early
nineteenth century. Its navigational utility led to its classification as a resource of national
importance by the middle of that century, which entitled the waterway to federal attention
that other rivers would not receive until decades later. Due to this status, the Mississippi
was the location of many of the earliest significant flood protection measures undertaken
in the United States.
Prone to flooding vast regions over much of its course, the Mississippi developed,
over many millennia, rich, deep-soiled floodplains that attracted Euro-American settlers
since the early years of European contact. In its lower reaches, the Mississippi deposited
alluvium from upstream, creating the fertile soils of the Great River’s bottomlands. That
silt was also responsible for the river’s natural levees. The flow creates low natural banks
over much of its course, most prominently along the lower portions of the river in the
present-day Deep South. One may think of levees as man-made embankments meant to
prevent rivers from overflowing their banks, but they also form without human
intervention. Natural levees are formed when rivers repeatedly overflow their channels.
When a river overflows its banks, its channel becomes much wider, and thus it flows
more slowly. Water that is flowing slowly cannot carry as much sediment as water that is
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flowing rapidly, and therefore sediment settles to the ground, eventually forming a
natural levee. Finer silt travels farther before settling, forming the fertile alluvial soils that
floodplains are known for.7
Even before American independence, settlers and trading companies had started
to bolster the natural levees in New Orleans and rural Louisiana, near the mouth of the
river. As a French colonial possession, New Orleans had levees four feet higher than the
natural ones by 1727. The construction and maintenance of these levees were the
responsibilities of the Company of the Indies, a trading company that was the sponsor of
New Orleans.8 When Louisiana transitioned to Spanish rule, levees in New Orleans
became publically supported, and remained that way when the territory was purchased by
the United States.9 In rural areas of Louisiana, however, levees were legally required, but
not publically financed. French colonial authorities required owners of land adjacent to
the Mississippi to fortify the river’s banks, a costly undertaking that excluded those of
lesser means from owning property along the river.10 Spanish officials maintained this
law. Upon its admission to the United States, Louisiana’s state government delegated
responsibility for rural levees to its parishes, or counties, which in turn followed the
established precedent by requiring landowners to build and maintain them.11 Private
citizens and companies continued to augment the banks of the Mississippi River

7

Paul Hudson, “Natural Levees,” in Stanley Trimble (ed.), Encyclopedia of Water
Science, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2008. Pp. 763-767.
8
Craig Colten, An Unnatural Metropolis: Wresting New Orleans from Nature (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005). 19.
9
Colten 20-21
10
Colten 20
11
Colten 21
10

throughout the early and mid 1800s.12 Scholarship on early riparian fortifications on the
Mississippi side of the river is very limited in comparison to that dealing with Louisiana.
Presumably, this is due to the fact that early settlement centered around New Orleans, and
the Mississippi River is surrounded by Louisiana on both sides for over 100 miles north
beyond the Crescent City.
Those early levees were rarely masterpieces of engineering. Historian Jeffrey
Owens emphasizes that their builders in the colonial and early national eras were merely
“practical people doing practical things.”13 As Owens points out, the Indians who
inhabited North America prior to European arrival did not view flood protection as a
necessity. His analysis is an extension of the argument articulated by William Cronon in
his landmark work of environmental history, Changes in the Land.14 Since Indian
societies in eastern North America were largely mobile and did not employ the concept of
private property, levees would have served little purpose to them. The Indians would
have simply left for high ground when floodwaters arrived. Such was not the approach of
the French who settled New Orleans. The European mindset was one of permanently
inhabiting and improving the land, and the region’s new arrivals saw levees as a logical
way to improve land near rivers. An early European settler might have thought of
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For early flood control activity in New Orleans and surrounding areas, see Colten 1646, and Jeffrey Alan Owens, Holding Back the Waters: Land Development and the
Origins of Levees on the Mississippi, 1720-1845 (Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State
University, 1999).
13
Owens 7.
14
William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New
England (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983).
11

building a levee on his land in the same way that he would have thought of clearing a
field or building a fence.15
As it had been in the colonial era, during the early national period, the effort to
control flooding in the Lower Mississippi River Valley was largely a community effort.
Local officials had the authority to order people to work on emergency levee
reinforcements if the fortifications appeared to be in danger, and though citizens were not
reimbursed for their services, they could be subject to prosecution if they declined to
help. The first major federal appropriations for navigational improvements on the
nation’s rivers came in 1824, but those were not intended to address inundations. Flood
control interests lobbied the federal government for support starting in the early 1800s,
with their movement becoming stronger and more organized by the 1840s. Nothing was
to happen on that front until 1850, however.16
Although the federal government would not become openly involved in the
funding of flood control measures until the twentieth century, it took a significant step in
that direction in 1850. The previous year, severe floods had hit the lower Mississippi, and
in 1850, due in part to cries for help from state-level engineers, Congress authorized a
study of the Mississippi River with the intent of gaining knowledge that would be useful
in flood protection. Although federal lawmakers had no intent of funding the protections
that might be suggested by the study, they had granted the federal government an
increased role in fighting floods by positioning it as a source of knowledge. Prior surveys

15

Owens 14-20
Cynthia Poe, Reconstructing the Levees: The Politics of Flooding in NineteenthCentury Louisiana (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2006). 71-85.

16
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of the river, conducted in the 1820s, had been administered with navigation in mind,
rather than addressing losses caused by water.17
Ultimately, Congress authorized not one, but two surveys. Charles Ellet Jr., an
engineer who had trained in France and had served as the chief engineer of multiple
American canals, directed one of them. The Corps of Topographical Engineers, an arm of
the War Department responsible for civil works projects, conducted the other. Authorized
as an independent entity by Congress in 1838, the Corps of Topographical Engineers
eventually merged with the Army Corps of Engineers in 1863. Andrew Humphreys, a
West Point graduate who had served in the Seminole War as a young man and had been
with the Corps of Topographical Engineers since its creation in 1838, led the Corps of
Topographical Engineers survey. Upon its 1861 publication, critics hailed Humphreys’
Report Upon the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River, as a scientific
masterpiece.18 The work garnered Humphreys honorary memberships in various
European scientific societies, and by 1866, helped propel him to the position of Chief of
Engineers within the Army Corps of Engineers.19
Despite their well-regarded efforts, events beyond the control of either Ellet or
Humphreys would keep their works from having an immediate impact. With the outbreak
of the Civil War, flood control was pushed to the back burner. Even after the conclusion
17

George S. Pabis, “Delaying the Deluge: The Engineering Debate over Flood Control
on the Lower Mississippi River, 1846-1861,” The Journal of Southern History 64:3
(August 1998) 421-454.
18
Andrew Humphreys and Henry L. Abbot, Report Upon the Physics and Hydraulics of
the Mississippi River; Upon the Protection of the Alluvial Region against Overflow; and
Upon the Deepening of the Mouths ... Submitted to the Bureau of Topographical
Engineers, War Department, 1861 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co, 1861).
19
Barry 21-22
13

of hostilities, Congress had more pressing concerns in the states of the former
Confederacy than dealing with the threat of floods.20
Today, the Army Corps of Engineers is almost synonymous with flood control
efforts. The connection between the military and civil engineering is not self-evident,
however, and merits some discussion. The Army Corps of Engineers became the federal
agency most directly involved with flooding issues upon its merger with the Corps of
Topographical Engineers. Its previous work with rivers had consisted mainly of
navigational improvements. The Corps of Engineers traces its origins to the
Revolutionary War. When the Second Continental Congress authorized the creation of
the Continental Army in 1775, it provided for six engineers—two chief engineers,
working independently of each other, and two assistants to each chief. The original role
of these engineers included responsibilities such as supervising the construction of
fortifications, surveying potential battlefields, planning sieges, and assisting with the
army’s transportation requirements.21 After the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, the
federal legislature did not retain any engineers in the permanent service of the United
States, but by 1794, when war threatened to break out with Britain, Congress reauthorized the employment of engineers by the Army. Eight years later, on March 16,
1802, lawmakers established the US Army Corps of Engineers in its modern form.
After the War of 1812, the responsibilities of the Corps of Engineers began to
expand beyond purely military obligations. A series of studies conducted by the Corps in

20

Pabis
United States, The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers: A History (Alexandria, VA:
Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Office of History, 2008). 1-4.

21
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1816 suggested that British successes during the War of 1812 could be attributed in large
part to the United States’ poor transportation system.22 The studies called for, among
other things, a highly mobile army and improved rivers, harbors, and roads. Congress
responded in 1824 by passing the General Survey Act, which authorized the Army Corps
of Engineers to survey road and canal routes deemed of national importance, for either
military or commercial reasons. The Topographical Bureau, established in 1818, was the
predecessor of the briefly independent Corps of Topographical Engineers, and served as
surveyors and explorers of the frontier.
Over the course of its history, many have seen the Army Corps of Engineers as a
symbol for national planning in the United States, in both positive and negative lights,
although that image is brought into question by some episodes of the Corps’ involvement
in flood control projects. In the early 1800s, treasury secretary Albert Gallatin envisioned
the Corps playing a leading role in the development of vast internal improvements. By
the Jacksonian era, the tide had turned. Andrew Jackson viewed infrastructure projects as
the

domain

of

state

governments,

and

believed

federal

involvement

was

unconstitutional.23 As described by historian Todd Shallat, the national planners
employed by Louis XIV of France, who helped modernize that country by means of
waterworks, highways, and other projects, provided the model for the Army Corps of
Engineers. In its early years, as the Corps developed its identity, a struggle developed
between the “self-made, builder-mechanic” ethic of British engineering, and the French

22

The US Army Corps of Engineers: A History 41
Todd Shallat, Structures in the Stream: Water, Science, and the Rise of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994). 121-153.

23
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model, in which “the army guided construction, and science was the methodical tool of a
rational, centralized state.” Shallat argues that the Corps’ advocacy of centralized
expertise and decision-making often put it at odds with the sentiments of the country as a
whole, as the United States is more culturally similar to Great Britain than France.24
Though the Corps has seen its fair share of attacks from those who see it as a tool
of an elite technocracy who wish to advance central planning, it has conversely been
characterized as dysfunctional due to its being beholden to powerful politicians and local
interests. Such were the charges leveled by Arthur Maass in his 1951 book Muddy
Waters.25 Shallat, whose book Structures in the Stream is one of the authoritative
histories of the formative years of the Corps and especially its relationship with water,
hesitates to call either perception entirely accurate. “In the end there is no simple way to
characterize Corps engineering,” Shallat writes. “Corps planning promotes system and
order. Corps field operations, locally implemented, serve a divided Congress rooted in
community power.”26
Two dominant personalities, Andrew Humphreys and James Buchanan Eads,
played large parts in determining the fate of human modifications along the Mississippi
in the late 1800s and into the 1900s. Eads, a self-taught man who became a worldrenowned engineer, gained intimate familiarity with the Mississippi as the founder of a
salvage company. His credibility in issues relating to the river was due to numerous
achievements, the most significant being his construction of the first bridge to cross the
24

Shallat 2
Arthur Maass, Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation’s Rivers
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951).
26
Shallat 207
25
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Mississippi at St. Louis. The two pushed different ideas for how to clear the Mississippi
for navigation—Humphreys favored canals to bypass troublesome areas, while Eads
pushed for the use of jetties, which are structures that constrict the flow of a river. Jetties
create in-river channels that cause scouring and thereby deepen the river. Eads
successfully demonstrated the workability of his ideas south of New Orleans, and his
success gave levees a boost. By constricting the channel of a river, they were assumed to
deepen its channel.27
Along with the channelization of the river, some of those with interests in it
desired to see its rich, alluvial soils made more useful for human occupation. For that to
happen, flooding would have to be reduced. Eads and Humphreys both had ideas about
how this should happen, too. Eads believed that by creating cutaways, places where extra
water could escape, along the river, flooding could be reduced to a few areas. Humphreys
favored reservoirs to store excess floodwater.
Ultimately, however, neither Eads nor Humphreys carried the debate. In order to
regulate further development along the Mississippi, Congress created the Mississippi
River Commission (MRC) in 1879, vesting it with authority that had previously been
held by the Army Corps of Engineers. The MRC, a seven-member panel consisting of
three civilians, three representatives of the Army Corps of Engineers, and one
representative of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, was tasked with gathering information
and making recommendations about any future navigational and flood control

27

Matthew Todd Pearcy, A History of the Mississippi River Commission, 1879-1928:
From Levees-only to a Comprehensive Program of Flood Control for the Lower
Mississippi Valley (Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Texas, 1996). 40-41.
17

developments to be built along the Mississippi. The MRC eschewed the ideas of Eads,
Humphreys, and Ellet, embracing instead an idea that all three had rejected as simplistic
at best and foolhardy at worst. The policy that came to be known as ‘levees-only’ dictated
that the man-made embankments alone could provide the necessary protection to
transform the Mississippi River floodplains into habitable landscapes immune to the
perils of raging waters. The attractiveness of levees stemmed in part, no doubt, from the
perception that they were effective at both reducing flooding and improving the river
channel. Matthew Pearcy, a historian who has written extensively on the MRC, argues
that levees-only resulted from the narrow interests of certain powerful politicians, rather
than from any scientific consensus.28
That levees would theoretically help improve the Mississippi’s channel was not a
trivial matter. Throughout the nineteenth into the twentieth centuries, the federal
government did not see flood control as its domain. Channel improvement, however, was
fair game, aiding defense, commerce, and transportation throughout the country. Those
interested in promoting federally supported flood mitigation improvements had to market
their projects as navigational improvements rather than flood reduction measures.29 The
federal focus on navigational improvements makes sense when one considers the
importance of waterways to inland transportation in the days before the spread of trains
and trucks. The Mississippi River and its tributaries comprised one of the world’s greatest
transportation networks prior to the advent of the railroad, with over fifteen thousand
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miles of navigable streams.30 The Army Corps of Engineers was charged with improving
and expanding this transportation network, upgrading the navigability of some rivers
while working to open others to boats. Just as the interstate highway system of the
twentieth century was justified in terms of national defense, navigational improvements
were also seen as a move to improve national security and military preparedness, so it
makes sense that responsibility for their upkeep would be delegated to the Army Corps of
Engineers. Stephen Long, an Army officer and explorer of the American West, had a
philosophy that is representative of the Army’s nineteenth century approach to rivers: “if
a waterway was navigable it was important and worth defending; once fortified, the
channel was worth improving to facilitate defense.”31
Due to political gridlock, the Mississippi River Commission was sorely
underfunded for the first ten years of its existence, and was able to make little progress
toward its goals of improved navigation and reduced flood losses. That would change
after the severe floods of 1890, which spurred lawmakers to allocate generous funds to
the engineering of the Mississippi. Over the next few years, levee building took off, and
by 1896, the members of the MRC were in general agreement that the levee system was
in good shape. That consensus was quickly challenged, as 1897 saw the highest flood
levels recorded along some parts of the lower Mississippi. The river breached its
restraints in various places, and a Senate committee conducted an investigation of the
flood control methods in use at the time. The members of the committee lacked intimate
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knowledge of the issue at hand, however, and relied heavily on the testimony of outside
experts—many from the MRC. The committee produced a report known as the Nelson
Report, after committee member Knute Nelson of Minnesota. The report concluded that,
despite recent evidence suggesting otherwise, levees were the best way to keep the
Mississippi River from flooding. Given the committee’s reliance upon MRC personnel in
forming its opinions, its finding in favor of levees becomes somewhat more
understandable, if not justifiable.32
The levees-only policy would remain in place for nearly half a century, but it did
have vocal critics even before its eventual downfall. George Maxwell, a lawyer from
California who had been involved in efforts to bring water to the arid American West,
was one. Maxwell’s interests extended beyond irrigation to developing a national water
policy, and he was convinced that earthen fortifications alone were not sufficient to
protect communities along the Mississippi River from severe overflows. Maxwell allied
with New Orleans businessmen in the 1910s to push for a more diversified approach to
flood protection. Maxwell’s plan called for a combination of spillways, floodways, and
storage reservoirs in addition to the levee system. In the words of historian Martin Reuss,
“(i)t was a remarkable document. Designed by a lawyer with no professional engineering
training, it resemble(d) the flood control plan later adopted by the Corps of Engineers for
the Atchafalaya basin.”33 Maxwell’s enthusiasm and credible plan, however, were no
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match for the entrenched system. The lawyer could do nothing but watch in helpless
anger when the Mississippi churned over its banks in the disastrous flood of 1927.34
At the same time that the Mississippi River Commission was pushing levees as
the best way to contain floods and improve navigation, others were casting an eye on the
potential uses of floodwaters. Historian Samuel Hays, author of the 1959 book
Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency, identified the effort to store excess water for
future use as the spark that ignited the conservation movement of the early twentieth
century. This movement is known largely for its attempts to perpetuate natural resources
for use by humans in the future, as opposed to the preservation movement, which
encouraged the protection of pristine, wilderness areas from humans. The endeavor to
safeguard natural capital for future use is also known for its reliance on scientific and
technical expertise, an argument first articulated by Hays.35
Hays describes federal politicians’ dreams of bringing the arid West to life by
conserving floodwaters for irrigation use during dry conditions. In 1902, Congress passed
the Newlands Reclamation Act, named after Representative Francis Newlands of Nevada.
The Newlands Act set up a system under which the federal government would sell land it
owned, and use the proceeds to build irrigation projects. Then, the newly irrigated land
would be sold, with those proceeds funding even more irrigation projects, forming a
cycle that would repeat itself until nearly all federally owned irrigable land was receiving
water. To administer the program, the act created the United States Reclamation Service,
34
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which later became the Bureau of Reclamation, under the jurisdiction of the Department
of the Interior. Thus, by the early 1900s, the federal government had become deeply
involved with the regulation of floodwaters, at least in certain parts of the country.
Clearly, however, the primary intent of the Reclamation Bureau was not to protect people
from floods, but to make use of floodwaters.36 As environmental historian Mikko Saikku
has observed, the roles were reversed in the West compared with the East. Western
landowners hoped to figure out better ways to keep water on their lands, while in the
East, people struggled to determine how best to keep water off their lands.37 The western
interests, clearly, were the first to gain unequivocal federal support for their exploits.
Despite its lack of support from various experts, levees-only remained the
cornerstone of federal floodplain policy for nearly half a century, in regions dealing with
a surplus rather than a shortage of water. It was finally washed away by the severe
Mississippi River flooding of 1927, one of the most destructive floods to ever hit the
United States. The floods of that year were foreshadowed in the fall of 1926, when heavy
rains caused the Mississippi River and several of its tributaries to rise, in some places, to
record levels. This was a particularly unusual occurrence to happen in the fall, usually a
time of low waters. However, the levees along the Mississippi held the waters in check,
and the only significant flooding that occurred during the fall of 1926 took place on
tributaries such as the Illinois and Neosho Rivers.38
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By November, the rains had abated, and river levels dropped from their record
heights. Even so, the water remained high, increasing the potential for devastation caused
by future rains. A river that is already high cannot accommodate as much incoming water
as a river that is low. Come January, the heavy precipitation returned, in the form of rain
in the south and snow farther north. Between January and April of 1927, the city of New
Orleans endured five storms that each brought more rain than any other storm in the
previous ten years.39 Levees along various Mississippi River tributaries failed in the early
months of 1927, and the first breach of a levee on the Mississippi itself happened at
Dorena, Missouri, on April 16. Four days later, the Mississippi breached its levee at
Mounds Landing, Mississippi, flooding much of the Mississippi Delta and causing
catastrophic losses of life and property.40
The 1927 levee breaches along the Mississippi struck a devastating blow to the
Mississippi River Commission’s levees-only policy. When floods in previous years had
breached the levees, the MRC was able to offer up the explanation that the breached
levees had not been built up to government-approved specifications.41 By 1927, however,
the entire system of levees along the Mississippi (though not all of its tributaries) had
been strengthened to meet or exceed the standards enacted by the MRC. The failure of
the levee system to hold back the floodwaters awakened debate over the most effective
methods of protection from floods.
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While the Mississippi River floods alone would most likely have been sufficient
to push Congress to act, New England was also hit by flooding, especially Vermont, in
late 1927. Deborah Pickman Clifford and Nicholas Clifford study that flood in their book
The Troubled Roar of the Waters.42 One of Clifford and Clifford’s noteworthy findings is
that after the flooding, there was almost no expectation that the government would step in
to aid those who had suffered losses caused by the waters. President Calvin Coolidge, a
Vermont native, notably stated that the federal government should not be involved in
insuring its citizens against natural disasters, a position that would lose support within a
few decades. Though part of the Vermonters’ stand against federal aid may be attributed
to the stereotypical self-reliant spirit of New Englanders, it also reveals a laissez-faire
attitude toward natural disasters that would dissipate at the federal level in the coming
years.
Thanks to the experiences of 1927, even the most entrenched supporters of the
MRC’s policy began to realize more fully the folly of relying solely on levees. Though
they can be useful when employed wisely, levees are problematic in at least two
important ways. For one, if they are breached, they can offer no further protection, and
may in fact make a situation worse than if no levee had existed at all due to the
destructive force of so much rushing water. Second, the more levees are built on any
particular river, the fewer escape routes will be available to floodwaters, causing an
increase in floodwater levels. Flood control acts passed in 1928 and subsequent years
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established federal support for other types of floodplain control, such as those suggested
by Humphreys, Eads, and Ellet—floodways and reservoirs playing important roles.
In direct response to the floods of 1927, the House of Representatives Flood
Control Committee evaluated over 300 proposals for new flood control plans. Two of
those plans emerged as leading contenders, one developed by the Mississippi River
Commission and one developed by Edgar Jadwin, Chief Engineer of the Army Corps of
Engineers. Neither plan advocated maintaining a complete reliance upon levees, although
the MRC’s plan would have continued to see them as the primary method of controlling
floods. Jadwin’s plan incorporated some aspects of the MRC’s plan—the plans were not
developed in complete isolation of each other—but also diverged in some important
aspects. One point of divergence was levees. Jadwin’s plan called for only a modest
bolstering of the levee system, rather than the more major reinforcement suggested by the
MRC. His plan also embraced a heightened reliance upon floodways, including one that
would stretch approximately 50 miles to protect Cairo, Illinois. The Jadwin Plan, as it
came to be known, was the plan that ultimately won favor with the Flood Control
Committee, and the Flood Control Act of 1928 passed it into law.43
Federal funding with the express purpose of flood control had first been
authorized for the Mississippi River with the Flood Control Act of 1917. Prior to that
time, debates about the propriety of federal funding of flood control structures had
dictated that any funding, even if its actual intent was to control floods, must be funded as
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‘channel improvement.’44 This was not completely disingenuous, as flooding certainly
makes rivers more difficult to navigate. It does, however, indicate the line that Congress
continued to draw between infrastructure improvements that were seen as benefiting the
nation as a whole, and property protection that was seen as benefiting individuals.
The Flood Control Act of 1917 stated, “For controlling the floods of the
Mississippi River and continuing its improvement … the Secretary of War is hereby
empowered, authorized, and directed to carry on, … the plans of the Mississippi River
Commission heretofore or hereafter adopted; to be paid for as appropriations may from
time to time be made by law.”45 Reflecting the aforementioned concerns about the
constitutionality of federally-funded projects that only benefit a portion of the nation’s
population rather than the nation as a whole, the 1917 act instituted a requirement that
any locality to be protected by a proposed levee improvement must contribute a “just and
equitable” amount to construction costs, not to be less than half of construction costs.
The 1917 act only funded levees, but the 1928 version also authorized federal
support for other types of structural flood controls, such as reservoirs to hold floodwater
and floodways to channel excess water away from flooding rivers. The 1928 act
appropriated 345 million dollars for flood control works, making it the largest public
works appropriation in American history at the time.46 Finally, the 1928 act began to
crack the previous policy that benefiting localities must provide a large portion of the
funding for any flood protection project. While local contributions were still required for
44
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most projects, those along the Mississippi were exempted from that requirement,
recognizing the large amounts (estimated in the bill at 292 million dollars) that localities
along the Mississippi had already poured into levee construction.47
The Flood Control Act of 1936 basically shattered the policy that had started to
show fissures in 1928. The 1936 act eliminated requirements for benefiting localities to
provide financial contributions to flood control projects, other than a requirement that
they provide the necessary land for the projects to the federal government at no cost. The
Secretary of War, however, could waive even this requirement. The 1936 act recognized
floods as a menace to national welfare, and therefore made flood protection the business
of the federal government. No longer was the federal government expressing concern
about funding projects that only benefit a limited number of people. As the 1936 act
stated, “the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improvement of
navigable waters or their tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-control
purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue (emphasis added) are in excess
of the estimated costs, and if the lives and social security of people are otherwise
adversely affected.”48
These changes in flood control policy, of course, did not happen in a void.
President Franklin Roosevelt, who took office in 1933, led a push to expand the role of
the federal government in numerous areas. Though changes had been occurring well
before his election—federal funding of levees expressly for flood control in 1917, and the
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end of levees-only in 1928—the 1936 flood control act was the one that was most
revolutionary in redefining the federal government’s role in flood protection.
With levees-only a thing of the past, and a new approach to flood control not yet
fully ascertained, a rare opportunity for new ideas presented itself. The intellectual
landscape, however, was somewhat barren. The realm of discussion to that point was
largely limited to alternative methods for engineers to confront high waters, and was not
greatly changed from the days of Eads and Humphreys. The years after 1927 saw a
variety of responses to the dangers of inundations. As water historian Martin Reuss has
demonstrated, without a firm policy to guide its endeavors, the Army Corps of Engineers
found itself pushed to action by various forces that did not always lead to the best longterm results. One such force was public opinion. After 1927, popular fear of floods was at
high tide, leading to an outcry for immediate action. Though Congress did take time to
consider the proposals that included the Jadwin Plan, other ideas were funded in the
meantime. Lawmakers would not allow themselves to be seen as doing nothing. The
result, in part, was a hurriedly developed system of levees, floodways, and spillways in
the Atchafalaya Basin. Though the system seemed to make sense when compared to
relying solely on levees, its hasty planning led to problems. The planned floodways were
not large enough to accommodate large floods, levees were built on unstable ground, and
sand dredged from the channels suffocated the local ecosystem. Another force was
powerful legislators, who took advantage of public opinion to push parochial projects.
Mississippi congressman William Whittington lobbied successfully for the construction
of a series of flood control reservoirs on the Yazoo River and its tributaries. Though the

28

reservoirs were shown to be much more expensive than the value of the flood control
they would provide, Whittington was able to spearhead their construction. Public opinion
was a powerful tool in his arsenal, as the construction projects could be justified as public
works programs that would provide jobs for the unemployed.49
Even by 1936, however, one thing had not changed—the official focus on
structural methods of floodplain management. Official policy no longer relied solely on
the strategy of confining waters within their banks, but it did continue to focus on
modifying the natural environment via added tools such as floodways and reservoirs. The
mindset of the nineteenth and early twentieth century was, in general, one of humans
imposing their will upon the natural landscape. In 1874, George Perkins Marsh, scarcely
known as an advocate of the ruthless exploitation of the earth’s resources, wrote that with
effective management techniques, “every great river may, in a considerable degree, be
deprived of its powers of evil and rendered subservient to the use, the convenience, and
the dominion of man.”50 That same year, Eads stated, “(d)isasters and serious accidents
are always evidence of bad engineering. … I believe [man] capable of curbing,
controlling, and directing the Mississippi, according to his pleasure.”51 Eads, Humphreys,
and Ellet each had somewhat different ideas about how the Mississippi River should be
controlled, but each clearly saw control as the primary objective. The Mississippi River
Commission, with its levees-only approach, continued the quest for control. This
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mentality was evident well beyond the realm of the Mississippi River. The belief that
rivers could be controlled and made to perfectly serve the needs of humans was a logical
manifestation of the Progressive Era faith in the ability of expertise to solve nearly all
problems, as well as the faith in the potential of engineering that had burgeoned
throughout the nineteenth century.
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes paid homage to this mindset in his 1935
speech dedicating the Hoover Dam, then known as the Boulder Dam. “Pridefully, man
acclaims his conquest over nature,” were the opening words of Ickes’ speech of
dedication. Yet, with the rest of his speech, Ickes attempted to draw a line between the
old and the new, signaling that the Roosevelt administration did not plan to look at the
world only in those terms. Moments later, he stated, “so long as nature can … destroy our
handiwork by fire or flood, and unleash from the caverns of the winds mighty hurricanes
to toss about in their rage all objects …, nature will continue to be unconquerable.”52
Within Ickes’ own Department of the Interior, new ideas about flood control, and about
how humans relate to nature in a broader sense, were percolating, soon to emerge on the
nation’s radar.
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CHAPTER 3
ACCOMMODATION, NOT DOMINATION: GILBERT WHITE JOINS THE
DISCUSSION

Into the murky waters of change swirling in the 1930s stepped a young
geographer, Gilbert Fowler White. White eventually developed a reputation as one of the
leading minds in floodplain management, a reputation that was earned in large part by the
ideas he articulated in his doctoral dissertation. White suggested that there are times in
which it makes more sense to allow nature to run its course, rather than steadfastly
pouring resources into modifying the natural environment, no matter the cost. Though the
policy of relying only on levees had fallen by the time White became active in the field,
the new way forward was not yet set in stone.
White’s ideas did not immediately come to bear on governmental policy at the
national level. Despite the demise of levees-only, the old guard remained focused on
using engineering to keep water away from people. White’s vision gradually gained
acceptance as it became more widely disseminated. This chapter focuses on the
development of White’s thinking in regard to floodplains, and the spread of his doctrine
to other professionals. By the early 1960s, the pioneering geographer had a notable
following, and his ideas were poised to move into federal policy.
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White, born in 1911, enrolled in the University of Chicago in 1927, settling a year
later on geography as his field of study. After finishing his undergraduate studies in 1931,
White immediately entered Chicago’s graduate program in geography. As a graduate
student, White had the good fortune of studying under Harlan Barrows, one of the most
renowned geographers of the early twentieth century. Barrows, the departmental
chairman and one of the pioneers of geography as a field of academic study, left his mark
on the field through his attention to the relationship between humans and the
environment. Despite the protests of his superiors, Barrows began in 1904 to teach a class
called “Influence of Geography on American History,” which would later be renamed
“Historical Geography of the United States.” His idea about this relationship did not
remain constant, though. Later in his career, Barrows came to view geography as the
study of human actors on a passive environment, rather than viewing the natural
environment as a determining factor in human societies.53 Barrows also took an interest
in the conservation movement that flourished in the early twentieth century, an interest he
shared with White.54 Barrows was a gifted thinker in his own right, but his temperament
was a millstone that perhaps held him back from ultimately becoming as influential as
White. Barrows was not known for getting along with those who disagreed with him, and
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as White’s biographer Robert Hinshaw relates, White took to calling Barrows “Simon
Legree,” after the cruel slaveholder in Uncle Tom’s Cabin.55
White, in contrast to Barrows, possessed a much more non-confrontational
reputation. Though his disposition undoubtedly helped him throughout his years as a
graduate student, his humility has perhaps contributed to his lack of renown outside of
the field of geography. White certainly provides a stark contrast with James Eads and
Andrew Humphreys, the colorful characters who were in the midst of the debate over
floodplains in the late 1800s. Despite his reputation as a peaceful man, however, White
did not completely avoid conflict, but merely sought to remain outside of the spotlight.56
White’s graduate studies were interrupted in 1933. That year, Barrows accepted
an appointment to the Mississippi Valley Committee, under the auspices of the Public
Works Administration. The committee, created as a part of Franklin Roosevelt’s New
Deal, had the purpose of “studying and correlating projects involving flood control,
navigation, irrigation, power, reforestation and soil erosion in the Mississippi drainage
area.”57 This appointment marked a move for Barrows from academia into public policy,
one that would be consequential for his own career and also White’s. Barrows asked
White to follow him to the Mississippi Valley Committee, and White accepted. White
assisted on Barrows’ initial assignment, to evaluate possibilities for dams on the Missouri
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River and its tributaries. The young geographer spent the next eight years working for the
federal government on flood control projects, while developing his own opinions about
the ways that alluvial regions should be used and regulated. Though his detour into public
service delayed the completion of his degree, White undoubtedly gained perspectives
during these years that he would not have found in a purely academic setting.
White entered the federal bureaucracy at a time of major change. The New Deal
produced an unprecedented expansion of the federal government. The era has inspired a
vast historiography, though New Deal era environmental policy has only received
scholastic attention in recent years. In This Land, This Nation, Sarah Phillips argues that
the Roosevelt administration focused on natural resources as a way to bring prosperity
back to rural areas of the country.58 In a section of the book focusing on New Deal era
water projects, Phillips stays true to this theme, arguing that flood control projects
undertaken during the 1930s were inspired in large part by two goals: rural electrification
and erosion control.
Neil Maher takes a different approach in Nature’s New Deal.59 Focusing on the
Civilian Conservation Corps, Maher argues that the environmental policies of the New
Deal formed a bridge between the conservation movement of the Progressive Era, which
promoted the protection of resources for future human use, and the environmentalist
movement that took hold after World War II, which encouraged the preservation of
natural areas due to their intrinsic value. Maher suggests that Roosevelt and some of his
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conservation advisors attempted to institutionalize this environmentalist ethic in the
federal bureaucracy prior to World War II, but were defeated by advocates of the older
conservation ethic. Though the available evidence does not point to White’s direct
involvement in this debate, his writings suggest that he was more loyal to the
conservationist ethic than the environmentalist ethic, especially early in his career.
Roosevelt’s proposal for a major, nationwide public works program, one that
included flood control measures, was only one of the unprecedented steps he took upon
entering office. With no previous model for federal public works programs of such a
magnitude, Roosevelt’s proposal initially set off a mad rush among legislators to try to
gain as large a share of the pie as possible for their constituents. The Roosevelt
administration quickly came to understand that without a unified plan, the proposed
public works spending could not live up to its potential. Thus, FDR spearheaded the
creation of numerous new planning agencies, of which White worked for several.60
In 1934, after assisting Barrows on his survey of dam possibilities, White moved
with his mentor to the Water Resources Committee, the replacement for the Mississippi
Valley Committee. In 1935, White became the staff secretary to the subcommittee on
water. He also later served as the secretary to the subcommittee on land.61 Federal
lawmakers initially placed the Water Resources Committee under the jurisdiction of the
National Resources Board, which was quickly replaced by the National Resources
Committee and then, in 1939, the National Resources Planning Board. White spent the
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final year-and-a-half of his stint in Washington working for the Bureau of the Budget
(BOB). Created by Congress in 1921, the BOB, the predecessor of the modern Office of
Management and Budget, was charged with assisting in the preparation of the national
budget.
In his work for the federal government, White quickly developed concerns about
the ways that flood control projects were justified. These reservations were evident as
early as 1934, in a letter written by White to Mississippi Valley Committee chairman
Morris Cooke.
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White suggested several changes to the national flood control policy

articulated in the Mississippi Valley Committee’s comprehensive report to Harold Ickes,
director of the Public Works Administration.63 The report suggested that the fate of
proposed flood control measures should be determined by their potential benefits,
compared to projected costs, but did not go into much more detail. White saw this
proposal as being too vague. For example, he thought authorities should distinguish
between inherent and derived benefits of flood protection. Inherent benefits, as White
defined them, include the most obvious benefits of flood control, such as reductions in
loss of life and property. Derived benefits include indirect advantages such as potential
increases in living standards or decreased expenditures for navigational improvements.
White also criticized the report’s proposed reliance upon calculations of damages averted
as a meter for judging the worth of potential flood control projects. Differential in land
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productivity, he suggested, could be much more informative in some places, such as
agricultural areas.
Within a few years, White began to make his suggestions public, writing articles
like “The Limit of Economic Justification for Flood Protection” and “Economic
Justification for Flood Protection,” (two separate articles with very similar titles) in 1936
and 1937, respectively. In the opening sentence of his 1937 article, White succinctly
stated the misgiving that had been troubling him over the previous several years:
“methods for measuring the economic justification for flood protection have failed to
keep pace with methods for determining engineering feasibility.”64 Going on, White
declared,
All who are familiar with the problem know that though one technician
may find a given flood-protection project unjustified by a ratio of costs to
benefits, another may find it amply justified through the use of the same
data but proceeding on different initial assumptions. Given assumptions
sufficiently liberal, some flood protection could be justified on most flood
plains in the United States. Given another set of assumptions, only a slight
amount of new flood-protection work could be shown as justified.65
By 1937, White was speaking publicly of using zoning to prevent unwise
encroachment on flood-prone lands. At that time, zoning had been employed in the
United States for more than two decades. The practice can be traced to Germany, where
city planners hoped to make housing at the edges of cities more affordable by limiting
population density. The first American zoning laws were passed in New York, in 1916, to
limit the spread of skyscrapers and keep the city’s transportation infrastructure from

64

Gilbert White, “Economic Justification for Flood Protection,” Civil Engineering 7:5
(May 1937): 345-348.
65
Ibid.
37

becoming overburdened. Zoning caught on quickly throughout the United States, but the
intent behind it did not remain the same for long. Realtors and property owners came to
see zoning as a way of stabilizing, and sometimes increasing, property values. As Daniel
Rodgers describes in Atlantic Crossings, by the 1920s, landowners had developed a
widespread faith that zoning, when well planned, would almost always benefit the
involved property owners.66
White gave a talk at the National Zoning Conference, sponsored in part by the
National Resources Committee, in December of 1937, arguing for increased usage of
zoning to regulate floodplains. He identified two types of zoning: ‘negative’ zoning,
which prevents further building in flood-prone areas, and ‘positive’ zoning, which
encourages types of land use that are more suited to flood-prone areas, such as
agriculture. Within this talk, White once again returned to his concerns over the
economic viability of structural protections against flooding. At the time, the federal
government was reviewing plans for major improvements to structural flood protections
throughout the country. White noted that in many towns, the assessed value of the entire
town was less than the cost of proposed flood protection structures. Zoning, he observed,
costs almost nothing to enact.67
White’s proposal contradicted the belief that zoning would increase property
values. In his presentation promoting the benefits of flood plain zoning, White
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acknowledged potential opposition to his idea. One broad sector of potential opposition,
White noted, could be property owners who might resent being told what they could or
could not do with their land. This concern would soon prove to be well founded, as
various members of California’s congressional delegation called for an investigation of
White the following year.68
By the early 1940s, White had formulated and refined the ideas that would define
much of his career. He distilled those ideas into a doctoral dissertation, entitled Human
Adjustment to Floods. He completed his dissertation in 1942, and the geography
department at Chicago accepted it the same year, but did not publish it until three years
later. In the meantime, White, in accordance with his developing Quaker convictions,
headed not back into government service, but to Europe to perform humanitarian work.
Some of the ideas White laid out in his dissertation had not gained mainstream
acceptance at the time of its publication, but within a few decades, they would become
highly influential to many people involved in floodplain management. A passage from
the introduction to Human Adjustment to Floods serves to illustrate White’s most basic
argument:
It has become common in scientific as well as popular literature to
consider floods as great natural adversaries which man seeks persistently
to overpower. According to this view, floods always are watery marauders
which do no good, and which society wages a bitter battle. The price of
victory is the cost of engineering works necessary to confine the flood
crest; the price of defeat is a continuing chain of flood disasters. This
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simple and prevailing view neglects in large measure the possibilities of
other forms of adjustment.69
An important component of White’s dissertation is his analysis of the options
available for responding to flooding risks. In Human Adjustment to Floods, White
identified eight different methods of adjustment to flood risks that had proven to be
effective in at least some situations. It is clear that White did not view all of these types
of adjustments equally. One way to classify White’s eight methods of adjustment is to
analyze what sort of relationship with nature they advocated. He described physical flood
control measures, which can be understood as attempts to overpower nature, least
favorably, making a compelling argument against trying to control nature. While levees
are effective to greater or lesser extents depending on the situation, they are not failproof. When they fail, it is as if nature has broken loose and released a powerful blow all
at once, clearly carrying the potential for catastrophic damage. An area with a breached
levee could easily suffer even more severe damage than if no levee had been there at all.
Other methods described by White embody a different attitude toward nature, a
realization that even in their most well designed efforts, humans cannot completely
subdue the natural world. In a continuum between trying to control nature and
accommodating natural risks, physical flood control measures would fall directly on the
“control nature” end of the continuum. Perhaps next closest to this end of the continuum
would be land elevation. As might be expected, White’s analysis of land elevation was
not terribly positive either, noting its frequent impracticality, though he did not condemn
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it as severely as he did physical flood control measures. Erosion control seems to sit
somewhere near the middle of the continuum, and it did receive White’s endorsement,
though limited to certain circumstances. On the “accommodate nature” end of the
continuum lie emergency measures, structural adjustments, and land use readjustment.
All three of these forms of adjustment to flooding received White’s generally enthusiastic
endorsement. It is readily apparent that White eschewed hubristic attempts to defy
nature’s tendency to unleash deluges from time to time, instead favoring approaches to
floodplain management that would provide the greatest benefit for the least expenditure,
whether of time, money, or other resources.
White also differentiated the solutions on the opposing ends of the continuum by
where they place responsibility. “Insurance and structural adjustments, by requiring a
property owner to make some payments for the advantages of floodplain location which
he enjoys, stimulate the abandonment or movement of occupance that is not profitable,”
he wrote.70 On the other hand, “(f)lood abatement, flood protection, and public relief, by
placing upon public agencies the major burden for reduction of losses, encourage the
occupants of flood plains to seek those adjustments at public expense even though other
adjustments at private expense might be less costly and more effective from the
standpoint of the nation.”71 White concluded, “present policy fosters an increasing
dependence by individuals and local governments upon the Federal government for
leadership and financial support in dealing with the flood problem. … (T)he policy does
not help or stimulate beneficiaries to explore the possibilities of making other
70
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adjustments….”72 In other words, White charged that through federal policy, which
favored domination of nature through massive public-spending projects, the government
was subsidizing a system that was not economically viable.
This part of White’s analysis reveals an awareness on his part that because of the
federal government’s changing role in floodplain management, the nation’s entire
approach to alluvial regions would have to change. In the past, left to their own devices,
certain individuals and localities did sometimes attempt to fight floodwaters through
ever-higher levees. Once the control of water became a federal interest, however, the
flaws in attempting to fight nature quickly became obvious. Though he did not explicitly
mention it, White had identified one of the strengths of the nation’s flood control policies
in earlier decades, and his dissertation suggested that it could be possible to merge the
risk calculations made by private landowners in the 1800s with the federal government’s
twentieth century foray into flood control measures. For the United States to utilize its
floodplains most effectively, White suggested a plan that would use all eight of the
approaches he had identified. While methods such as levees and reservoirs are
appropriate at certain times, he suggested, they must be balanced with techniques of
accommodation rather than domination of nature.
White’s eight methods of adjustment to flood risks are summarized in the following
paragraphs, ordered roughly according to his attitude toward them.73 Emergency
evacuations, White argued, offer one of the best opportunities to decrease flood-related
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losses—life, more so than property—without spending a lot of money. The success of
emergency measures depends on the existence and broad knowledge of flood evacuation
plans and on accurate weather forecasts.
White also saw land use readjustment as an important and underused way to reduce
damages. Though some buildings on flood plains must be there because of their
functions, alluvial regions are also often used for activities that do not depend on ready
access to water or deep soils. Zoning against future building is fairly easy, White noted,
but removing existing building presents more of a challenge and must often rely upon
public subsidies for relocation, purchasing of land, and demolition.
Flood insurance was another tool in which White saw promise. Private insurers in
the United States had tried their hand at offering policies to cover losses caused by high
waters and failed well before 1942. Nonetheless, White saw flood insurance as being an
important component of successful adaptation to flood hazards. Because of insurability
issues, White realized that this sort of adjustment might need government support to be
sustainable. He envisioned using flood insurance regulations to encourage adoption of
other types of adjustment such as improved emergency measures and structural
readjustments.
In many cases, White believed, extant development in low-lying regions could be
structurally adjusted to reduce potential damages. Such structural adjustments are on a
smaller scale than physical protection, and would include measures such as re-grading
streets and re-thinking the layout of existing buildings. Rather than tearing up entire
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neighborhoods or cities, White suggested that these structural adjustments could be
implemented as a part of regular maintenance.
Forest management, White believed, was a tool that was potentially beneficial,
albeit time-taking to implement and not applicable in all situations. Strong, healthy
forests can reduce erosion and the flow of debris. This type of adaptation, White said, had
proven to be successful in certain instances but had not been sufficiently studied, as of
1942, to make broad generalizations about its utility in flood mitigation.
Land elevation, White wrote, is generally reliable, but often economically
unjustifiable. It is particularly difficult to implement in areas that have already been
developed. This method of confronting high waters involves moving earth to raise the
level of buildings away from flood hazards.
Physical protections from floods, including levees, reservoirs, and floodways,
includes the methods that were most commonly employed throughout the United States
in the early 1940s. One problem endemic to levees and floodwalls is that if they are
breached, then severe damage will occur. Not only will the floodwaters be just as high as
if there was no levee in the first place, but the waters will also rush over the land
extremely rapidly, and with great intensity. Additionally, White posited that physical
protections might invite further settlement of floodplains by providing a sense of safety
that may not be completely justified. Despite his concerns about over-reliance upon such
methods, White did conclude that in many instances, physical protections offer the most
effective way to reduce losses caused by floods.
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White did not write fondly of public relief, yet neither did he dispute its necessity.
Although he implicated the broad availability of public relief in encouraging people to
build irresponsibly on floodplains, he acknowledged that it must remain available in
some form as long as the other methods of adjustment have not been fully adopted. In
practice, it seems highly unlikely that White’s other ideas would ever be adopted so
completely that public relief would never be necessary.
White’s preference for accommodating, rather than dominating, nature does not
necessarily mean he was some sort of proto-environmentalist. Many modern
environmentalists advocate accommodating nature because of its inherent value. White,
in his dissertation, expressed no such sentiments. His frequent preference for
accommodating nature derived instead from cost-benefit analysis. In White’s evaluation,
attempts to dominate nature were often more expensive than the value of the benefits they
provided, and in certain cases such as breached levees, the difference could be dramatic.
Critics such as White’s opponents from California’s congressional delegation
charged that his ideas would amount to the government dictating to its citizens how they
could and could not use their own private property. While there is truth to this suggestion,
those who harbored that concern neglected an important reality: even before the 1930s,
the federal government already had been telling its citizens how they could use flood
plains. Its method of doing so was perhaps more subtle than the zoning regulations White
proposed, but it was nonetheless very real. By providing funding for levees, the
government was telling people that it was fine to live in flood-prone areas. Furthermore,
as White noted, by providing relief and recovery money, often with no terms attached,
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the federal government was suggesting not only that was it was acceptable to inhabit
floodplains, but that if the flood was severe enough, they could count on public dollars to
bail them out in times of high waters.74 From 1874 through the mid-1920s, this relief
consisted largely of emergency relief such as food, tents, and medicines. However, after
1927, Congress passed bills with language such as “to aid in rehabilitation of farm lands
in areas affected by floods” and “to aid the State of Alabama in construction of roads
damaged by floods in 1929.”75 While these bills did not place certain development offlimits, as White later argued for at the National Zoning Conference, they definitely
increased the federal government’s role as an active player in determining the future
direction of floodplain development.
Another component that White saw as a part of a comprehensive floodplain
management plan was an understanding of the benefits of inhabiting floodplains. Some
types of inhabitation, such as factories that need large amounts of water for cooling, draw
great advantages from locating on lands susceptible to flooding, advantages that might
not be found anywhere else. Other types of inhabitation, such as mills, depended on their
locations near rivers for power at one time, but by the time of White’s thesis, that
dependence may have been broken by cheap electrical power. Still other types of
inhabitance, such as low-income housing, derive no material benefits from being located
in floodplains.76
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As the capstone of his analysis, White argued that in an effective system of
floodplain management, “any action will promote adjustments or readjustments that favor
the type or types of land occupance most likely to contribute to effective use of floodplain resources.”77 In short, White had articulated a set of ideas that demonstrated the
marked changes that had taken place in flood control in the prior century and
foreshadowed further changes yet to come. In the mid nineteenth century, it would have
been unthinkable to consider a comprehensive federal plan for dealing with floodplains,
because the protection of floodplains was not understood at that time to be a federal
responsibility. With the formation of the Mississippi River Commission in 1879, the
federal government began to wade into floodplain management, albeit with the ostensible
purpose of improving navigation. Its methods, however, were largely the same as those
employed by state and local governments, and private citizens: the construction of levees.
By 1927, though, insurmountable evidence existed to suggest that riparian fortifications
alone could not protect America from raging floodwaters. When the levee system was
limited to the piecemeal efforts of individuals and local governments, its flaws remained
disguised. With federal support, though, the levee system was no longer piecemeal, but
unified and built to impressive specifications. When the levees still continued to fail, it
became obvious that a new approach was needed. White’s dissertation would eventually
provide the blueprint for such a new approach.
The 1930s, when White served in the federal bureaucracy, had been a time of
significant change in the way the nation responded to the threat of floods. By the time
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White finished his dissertation, however, that era of change was nothing more than a
memory. World War II demanded a large portion of the federal government’s attention in
the first half of the 1940s, and even after the war was over, its specter remained for years
to come. It would not be until the 1960s that the federal government vigorously renewed
its focus on the issues of floods and floodplains in the United States.
Silence did not prevail on the subject of floods, though, even during the intervening
years. While the federal government turned its attention to other matters, scholars
continued to ponder how to respond to the dangers posed by deviant waters. The fact that
White’s ideas helped drive the discussion is just as critical as the ideas themselves.
White’s significance does not derive solely from his origination of a new vision. More
than half a century before White delved into the issue of floodplain management,
Vermonter George Perkins Marsh, considered by some to be one of America’s first
environmentalists, expressed concerns that parallel some of White’s ideas. Like White,
Marsh described a variety of possible ways to reduce damage from floods, although
Marsh largely limited his discussion to structural means of adjustment. In a passage that
was a harbinger of White’s dissertation, Marsh stated, “Upon the whole, it is obvious that
no one of the methods heretofore practiced or proposed for averting the evils resulting
from river inundations is capable of universal application. Each of them is specially
suited to a special case. But the hydrography of almost every considerable river and its
tributaries will be found to embrace most special cases, most known forms of fluid
circulation.”78 White certainly added his own new ideas to the discussion on floodplain
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usage, but his importance is also due to the fact that he was able to put his beliefs into
action, ultimately affecting the dialog on floodplains to a much greater extent than his
intellectual forebears.
Within a few years of its 1945 publication, the influence of White’s dissertation
started to become evident in the thinking of others. One scholar who was an early
advocate of White’s ideas was political scientist Arthur Maass. In 1951 Maas published
Muddy Waters, which criticized the Army Corps of Engineers’s irrigation flood control
projects as too influenced by the desires of special interests and individual members of
Congress, rather than by the good of the country as a whole.79 In his discussion of how a
responsible floodplain management program should be designed, Maass discussed seven
of the eight forms of adjustment described by White, leaving out only public relief.
Maass credited White, who he deemed “a distinguished geographer and water expert,”
with inspiring his vision for a responsible approach to floodplains.80
In 1953, the dissemination of White’s ideas gained steam when his dissertation
went through a second printing.81 The geographer’s influence is evident in the writings of
Luna Leopold, a hydrologist who was the son of renowned ecologist Aldo Leopold. In
The Flood Control Controversy (1954), which Luna Leopold co-authored with Thomas
Maddock, the authors wrote, “flood plain occupancy … is in direct competition with the
river. Floods … are characteristic of rivers. The mere existence of a flood plain is prima
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facie evidence of floods. This does not in any way imply that flood protection is not a
necessity in the civilized world. It merely means that complete prevention of floods is a
physical impossibility.” The authors cited White in this discussion, though even without
the citation, his ideas are plainly evident.82
William Hoyt and Walter Langbein, co-authors of the 1955 book Floods, clearly
demonstrated their allegiance to the new way of thinking about floodplains. Popular
enough to warrant second and third printings in 1966 and 1970, Floods was obviously
influenced by White’s ideas. As Hoyt and Langbein stated, “(o)ur present practice is to
adjust rivers to man’s convenience, without stopping to think whether there is merit to the
opposite idea embodied in the title of a too-little-known book by Gilbert White, President
of Haverford College, entitled Human Adjustment to Floods.”83 Commenting on the
increasing development of flood plains, channeling White, Hoyt and Langbein wrote,
This growing use of the flood plain is running counter to the diminishing
importance of rivers as avenues of trade. The reasons of course reflect the
real and seeming advantages of flood plains: valley lands are level, water
supplies are close at hand, waste disposal may be easy, and so on. The
trouble lies not so much in the fact that flood plains are occupied, as in the
fact that so much of the use disregards the basic functions inherent in the
flood plain as a part of the river.84
By their suggestion that a floodplain should be viewed as a part of a river, Hoyt
and Langbein clearly endorsed White’s viewpoint that there are risks that must be
considered when inhabiting floodplains. Further, with this suggestion, Hoyt and Langbein
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implied that these risks are often greater than the potential rewards. The authors of
Floods also agreed with White’s analysis that by the middle of the twentieth century,
rivers were no longer as important for many types of development as they once had been.
Hoyt and Langbein also addressed the question of whether floodplain zoning laws
are undemocratic, the issue that had dogged White two decades earlier. Hoyt and
Langbein conceded that floodplain zoning laws can be interpreted as in opposition to the
American individualist ethic, wherein every person has the liberty to decide on their own
what risks they are willing to take. The authors were basically acknowledging the same
attitude that caused California’s Congressional delegation to question White’s patriotism.
As Hoyt and Langbein noted, however, the involved individuals do not always know
those risks. In one early instance of people trying to address this situation, Hoyt and
Langbein pointed out that “a group of engineers in Iowa City, Iowa, advised the city to
consider informing those who request permission to build along Ralston Creek of the
ever-present hazards of flooding.”85 Perhaps if that information had been more widely
disseminated, or if local officials had gone so far as to take the “un-American” action of
preventing development along the creek, some of those concert-goers described in the
introduction to this thesis would not have been scrambling to save their possessions scant
days later.
White’s ideas also continued to carry weight in the University of Chicago’s
geography department, which he had returned to as its head in 1956 after a stint as the
president of Haverford College. In 1958, White’s Chicago colleague Francis Murphy
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published Regulating Flood-Plain Development.86 In its preface, Murphy noted that while
he had been working in the field of flood control for twenty years, “it was the chance
reading of Mr. White’s book Human Adjustment to Floods that supplied the inspiration
and will to undertake this study.”87 From the perspective of 1958, Murphy wrote that
“(t)he picture of past accomplishments in flood-plain regulation is bleak. However, recent
increased uses of some techniques of regulation—mainly zoning, urban renewal, and
government

acquisitions—enable

one

to

view

future

accomplishments

more

optimistically.”88 Murphy acknowledged that continued floodplain development in the
United States is probably inevitable, but suggested that “if we seriously want to reverse
the trend of ever increasing uneconomic development and its resulting increasing flood
losses and flood-damage prevention costs, then a greater attempt needs to be made to
guide this development.”89 Murphy also addressed the issue of flood insurance, noting
that its effectiveness in reducing flood losses would depend on how it is regulated—a
topic that would come to the forefront a decade later. Even the cover of Regulating
Flood-Plain Development reflected White’s thinking, specifically on the topic of
structural adjustments. The cover features two pictures. One is of floodplain-level
buildings severely damaged by flood. The other is of a modern looking (by 1958
standards) building that is also on a floodplain, but is supported by pylons well above
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potential flood levels. The second building, a caption notes, easily avoided damage
despite enduring the highest flooding the region had seen in 20 years.
As White’s ideas began to influence others who were thinking about floodplains,
the geographer himself continued to address the issue in various writings, increasingly
focusing on a new type of challenge. White edited a collection of essays in 1961 entitled
Papers on Flood Problems, which included contributions by thirteen authors, most of
whom addressed the sorts of issues first raised by White’s dissertation.90 In the book’s
introduction, White acknowledged that by 1961, some of the ideas he promoted were
gaining more widespread acceptance. More options, however, meant a harder decision
process. In the 1930s and 1940s, floodplain adjustment was rather straightforward, since
works of engineering were largely the only forms of adjustment to be given official
consideration. Thus, in any particular situation, the equation was simple: are structural
improvements financially justifiable? If so, proceed, but if not, do not proceed. With the
increased attention being paid to the various other forms of adjustment suggested by
White, the equation was becoming more complicated, as authorities had to make
decisions about which types of adjustment were most suitable to any given situation,
rather than simply deciding whether or not structural protections were justified.
White cited Lewisburg, Tennessee, and Laona Township, Illinois as two
communities in which his ideas were being employed by 1961, albeit through different
approaches. Lewisburg took advantage of expertise supplied by the Tennessee Valley
Authority, which offered detailed flood risk analysis to the town. With that information,
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Lewisburg enacted zoning ordinances to prevent further encroachment into flood-prone
areas. Laona Township, on the other hand, was not offered such federally funded
expertise, but nonetheless enacted zoning ordinances based on the knowledge of local
farmers.91
By the early 1960s, a new approach to floods and floodplains, initially advocated
only by a few scattered voices in the wilderness, had gained a healthy following among
those concerned with floodplain management. The federal push into alluvial
administration had made clear by 1927 that a new approach was needed, and over the
next three decades, numerous professionals took part in formulating one, none more
important than Gilbert White. In 1960, however, this new approach had yet to conquer
the highest levels of federal policy. The presidency of Lyndon Johnson would present an
opportunity for that to happen.
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CHAPTER 4
WHITE’S IDEAS FULFILLED: THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM

In 1965, Hurricane Betsy provided the most immediate impetus for the process
that would ultimately result in sweeping changes to the way that the American
government approached floods. The first hurricane to cause over one billion dollars in
damages in the United States, not adjusted for inflation, Betsy pounded New Orleans in
early September of that year.92 Betsy’s fallout would ultimately include the creation of a
federally subsidized flood insurance program, one of the adjustments Gilbert White had
proposed in his dissertation. This insurance program is especially representative of
White’s thinking because it was also laden with incentives to encourage another nonstructural adaptation, alluvial zoning. Never in the past had the federal government been
so supportive of measures that would encourage people to consider accommodating
nature’s most flood-prone regions, rather than trying to overcome sometimesinsurmountable challenges. This chapter addresses the process leading up to the 1968
creation of the National Flood Insurance Program, and also examines previous abortive
efforts to implement a system of federally supported flood coverage. Though White was
not involved in the creation of the legislation itself, he led a study that was commissioned
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in response to Betsy with the objective of proposing a new approach to floods. That
survey, and a sister study focusing specifically on insurance, provided the knowledge
base for the legislators who would legally encode a new way of relating to natural risks.
In the Southeast Hurricane Disaster Relief Act of 1965, which was passed in
response to Betsy and contained mostly relief provisions, section five called for the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to initiate a study of alternative
ways to aid those affected by natural disasters including floods. The study was to focus
substantially on the unfunded and dormant program laid out by the Federal Flood
Insurance Act of 1956.93 Recognizing the need to study alternative adjustments to floods,
but believing that the HUD-led study was not given enough time or resources to provide
a thorough overview of the current situation, the Bureau of the Budget (BOB) formed a
task force to prepare a second study. Unlike the dual studies led by Ellet and Humphreys
more than a century earlier, these two study groups worked together as allies rather than
as rivals, coordinating their focuses so as to avoid needless duplicate efforts. The BOB
study, which Gilbert White led, provided a broader look at flood plain usage, while the
HUD study, with Marion Clawson in charge, focused more specifically on flood
insurance.94 The White-led task force produced a report in 1966, entitled A Unified
National Program for Managing Flood Losses.95 In a letter that accompanied the report
to the House of Representatives, President Lyndon Johnson praised twenty years of
efforts to mitigate flood losses. However, Johnson also observed that wayward waters
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were still costing the United States over a billion dollars annually. The report itself noted
several flooding catastrophes that had occurred over the previous decades, suggesting that
with a broader approach to floodplain regulation, the disasters might have been avoided,
or at least diminished. He cited the 1951 flood in Kansas City, in which floodwaters
crested levees that were presumed to provide sufficient protection, and the 1965 South
Platte flood near Denver, in which urban development sprawled into flood-prone areas. 96
Disasters like these, Johnson wrote, were the inspiration for a continued push to
find even more effective resolutions to the problem of flooding. Significantly, Johnson
stated, “the key to resolving the problem lies, above all else, in the intelligent planning
for and State and local regulation of use of lands exposed to flood hazard.”97 Thus, by
1966, the president of the United States was embracing the ideas that Gilbert White had
put forward over 20 years earlier. Accommodating the risks posed by floods, rather than
simply trying to dominate nature, had become a presidential position.
The Task Force on Federal Flood Control Policy, the group commissioned by the
BOB, had nine members, with White serving as its chairman. Also on the committee was
Walter Langbein, co-author of Floods. Other committee members included Irving Hand,
president of the American Institute of Planners, environmental economist John Krutilla,
housing policy specialist Morton Schussheim, agricultural economist Harry Steele, John
Hadd of the U.S. General Accounting Office, Richard Hertzler of the Army Corps of
Engineers, and James Goddard of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
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In its report, submitted to Congress on August 10, 1966, the task force articulated
five broad goals that it recommended the United States government pursue.

98

First, it

suggested improving basic knowledge about flood hazards. One facet of this effort would
be a three-stage program undertaken by agencies including the United States Geological
Survey and the Army Corps of Engineers. The first two stages were designed to be
rapidly attainable, in six months and two years, respectively. For the first phase, the
Corps of Engineers, with aid from other agencies such as the Department of Agriculture,
the Department of the Interior, and the Tennessee Valley Authority, would compile a
listing of all towns and streams with flooding problems. For the second stage, the
Geological Survey would outline floodplains on maps or aerial photographs. In the third
stage, the Corps of Engineers would accelerate its program of providing flood hazard
information reports to communities at risk. The Corps of Engineers had already supplied
such evaluations to around three hundred communities, but the task force argued that
there were ten times more localities that still needed these flood hazard analyses The risk
appraisals were to be completed within ten years.99 A second suggestion to help improve
knowledge was the establishment of a uniform technique of determining flood frequency.
The Water Resources Council, which had been established in the Water Resources
Planning Act of 1965, would lead this effort, drawing on expertise in the areas of
hydrology, mathematics, and economics.100 A third facet of this goal would be to collect
more-detailed data on flood damage than the current standard, and to collect this
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information in uniform fashion. The Corps of Engineers and the Department of
Agriculture would make decennial flood-damage appraisals, concurrent with the census,
and those agencies would conduct special surveys any time a particularly severe flood
occurred.101 Finally, the Departments of Housing and Urban Development and
Agriculture and the Geological Survey would jointly conduct research to better
understand flood plain occupancy and urban hydrology. This would include studies of
flood-resistant building designs, successful flood plain zoning ordinances, and factors
that affect decisions to occupy the flood plain.102
The improvement of basic flood knowledge is clearly in line with White’s way of
thinking. Dating back to his early years in the New Deal bureaucracy, White had been
calling for improved cost-benefit analyses of flood control projects, and the quality of
such analyses is wholly dependent on the level of available information. Floodplain
maps, uniform determinations of flood frequency, and flood damage appraisals would
also be essential components of a successful flood insurance program.
A second goal articulated by the task force report was to coordinate and plan any
new development in flood plains. The task force noted that although the federal
government directly controlled the building of federal installations in alluvial regions, it
was less able to regulate the building done by private individuals and corporations. Those
builders are regulated at the state and local levels, so the report challenged the federal
government to provide leadership that would be followed by state and local governments.
The task force saw the Water Resources Council as an important part of this effort, and
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suggested that the Council should work with state and local governments to develop
state- and local-level flood plain regulations. The assembled flood experts also called for
the WRC to hold an annual conference that would bring together federal, state, and local
agencies to discuss flood plain usage.103 Another recommendation made by the task force
toward the accomplishment of its second goal was to ensure that state and local planning,
working with certain federal programs, would take proper account of flood hazards. Land
development proposals in connection with federally backed mortgage programs would
receive engineering analyses that would take flooding and drainage problems into
account. Likewise, highway planning would take risks of flooding into account more
fully, to reduce the maintenance costs made necessary by flood-damaged roads. The
department of Housing and Urban Development would direct federal grants for the
purchase of open space for conservation and recreation, as authorized by the Housing Act
of 1961, to be used to purchase flood-prone land when possible, to keep it from other
forms of development.104 A third recommendation toward the goal of coordinating and
planning new flood plain developments was that the Office of Emergency Planning, the
Small Business Administration, and the Treasury Department, among other agencies,
should increase their support of relocation and floodproofing, as opposed to repetitive
reconstruction. This could be accomplished by ordering the Small Business
Administration to require relocation as a qualification for certain loans, and by creating
tax incentives to encourage relocation away from floodplains and floodproofing.105
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Finally, the task force recommended President Johnson issue an executive order directing
federal agencies to take flood hazards into account when undertaking new construction,
and directing that when flood-prone federally-owned land is transferred to non-federal
entities, restrictions should be attached to preclude future development that could create
public expenses in either relief or flood protection. 106 This final recommendation was the
first in the entire report to be acted on. In his letter transmitting the report to Congress,
Johnson announced an executive order requiring all federal agencies to take flood risks
into account when building new federal facilities.107
Several of the recommendations relating to the goal of regulating new alluvial
development would have required either new laws or expansions of federal and state
bureaucracies, or both. Ultimately, insurance would offer a method of advancing this goal
with much less overhead. By basing the availability of insurance on wise floodplain
development, the need for legal regulation would be decreased.
The third goal stated by the task force was to provide technical services to
managers of flood plain property. “Construction of works for flood control is better
known and understood than the alternative and supplementary measures for reducing
flood damages,” the report stated, echoing the concern articulated by White as much as
three decades earlier.108 The task force recognized that some government agencies had
already made the effort to compile data and reports that could be useful in implementing
alternative methods of reducing flood damages, but observed that these reports were not
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well publicized. To remedy this situation, the experts called upon the Army Corps of
Engineers to compile and broadly distribute a listing of available information and
reports.109 Further, the task force noted that while some publications existed, many types
of adjustment to floods lacked adequate instructive materials, particularly those
discernible to laymen. To address this problem, the flood specialists called for a series of
guides and pamphlets on alternative measures, an effort to be led by the Army Corps of
Engineers.110 The task force also urged improvement to a particularly important type of
technical service, flood forecasting. This task was to be assigned to the Environmental
Science Services Administration, which at the time included the Weather Bureau. The
report called for automated reporting of river levels, to better predict floods, and flash
flood forecasts to enable emergency evacuation and protection.111
The fourth goal identified by the task force was to enact a national flood insurance
program. “The concept of flood plain occupance charges and indemnification of flood
losses constitutes a theoretically ideal procedure for using economic incentives to adjust
flood plain use optimally in taking into account the hazards imposed by nature,” the
report stated.112 The council’s discussion of flood insurance was relatively brief,
including the precaution that if enacted improperly, it could actually increase the
magnitude of flood losses by discouraging those building in flood plains from
reconsidering their building locations or floodproofing. In contrast, a well-planned flood
insurance program would have several benefits. It would ensure that people choosing to
109
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live in areas prone to flooding would take financial responsibility for their choices. It
would encourage regulation of flood plains. Most importantly, it would help prevent new
development in flood plains in which the projected benefits would not exceed the cost of
insurance. The task force recommended that the Clawson study be granted more time to
include a detailed examination of flood insurance, a recommendation that was partially
enacted. The Clawson study group did not receive as much time as the task force had
recommended, but it did include a major emphasis on flood insurance in its report.
The final goal articulated by the task force was to adjust federal flood control
policy to ensure a more efficient return on the federal investment. One way the task force
proposed to achieve this was to shift the expenses of flood control projects so that those
who stood to gain from them would pay a larger share of the costs. “The more widely the
beneficiaries share in costs, regardless of the type of project, the more likely the programs
will promote efficient and socially desirable use of flood plains,” the report stated.113 In
one way, this was reminiscent of the way flood control projects were funded during the
United States’ first century, when they were the responsibility of individuals and local
governments. It ran directly countered the position advanced by the Flood Control Act of
1936, which promoted the federal funding of flood control projects as long as they
provided a worthwhile benefit to someone. The task force was hardly calling for a return
to simpler days, however, as it obviously advocated a strong, and in many ways
increasing, role for the federal government. The task force also recommended
distinguishing the benefits derived from flood control projects into two categories:
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reduction of damages to existing property, and benefits that could accrue from future
development.114
In many ways, these goals reflect White’s ideas about floodplain control. By
improving basic knowledge about flood hazards, communities and individuals would
become more able to make informed decisions about development and flood preparation.
By encouraging federal and state agencies to coordinate developments on flood plains,
more governmental oversight would help prevent people from building in particularly
risky areas. Looking back to the methods of adjustment identified in White’s doctoral
dissertation, four of the methods described most favorably by White—structural
adjustments, land use adjustments, emergency evacuations, and flood insurance—are
among the ideas advocated by the task force report. As the report concludes, “the effect
of these recommendations over the long run would be to reduce the annual bill which the
Nation pays for flood losses and to curb uneconomic federal expenditures for new flood
control. This would be achieved without setting up new federal organizations, and
without placing a heavy burden upon federal personnel.”115 White’s ideas of
accommodating the risks of flooding were being presented as the best economic option.
White was not directly involved in the creation of the HUD report on flood
insurance, but the document nonetheless bore unmistakable signs of his influence. “Two
objectives of flood insurance are equally important: to help provide financial assistance
for victims of flood disasters in order to rehabilitate their property; and to help prevent
unwise use of land where flood damages would mount steadily and rapidly,” the appraisal
114
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stated.116 The report identified insurance as one of seven ways to reduce damages and aid
victims, the others being land use regulation, flood warning systems, flood forecasting,
flood protection works, planning and management of flood-prone areas, and flood relief.
All seven of these methods were discussed in White’s 1945 thesis. The HUD report
contained many suggestions that would be passed into law in 1968, including that the
program initially focus on dwellings of four families or less, that it decline coverage to
new construction in high-risk zones, and the federal government seek participation of
private insurers in the proposed program.117
At the time of the two reports in 1966, flood insurance was not yet readily
available in the United States. This is not to say that flood insurance was an entirely new
concept to Americans at the time of the creation of the NFIP. A private company that
sold flood insurance was founded after flooding along the Mississippi River in 1895 and
1896. The company did not last long, however, as further flooding in 1899 ruined it
financially.118 The company’s failure is not surprising. No matter how well capitalized an
insurer may be, selling flood insurance in the open market, with terms similar to other
types of insurance, is a losing proposition. Even publicly supported flood insurance had
created blips on the national radar prior to the process leading up to 1968. In his call for
relief spending for the midwestern floods of 1951, President Truman asked Congress to
create a national, federally supported flood insurance program. Flood insurance was only
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one of five parts of the relief bill Truman asked for, with the other four parts being much
more traditional: indemnification of flood losses, low-interest loans to flood victims, aid
to help farmers drain and rehabilitate their land, and loans to allow state and local
governments to expand their rehabilitation efforts. On flood insurance, Truman stated,
The lack of a national system of flood-disaster insurance is now a major
gap in the means by which a man can make his home, his farm, or his
business secure against events beyond his control. It is a basic requisite to
the rapid reopening of plants in the flood region, where dikes cannot be
rebuilt for some months, and companies are unwilling, in some cases, to
undertake the risk of being inundated in the meantime.119
Truman proposed that the flood insurance program be modeled after the war-risk
insurance in effect during World War II, with private insurers offering policies and being
reimbursed by the federal government. In his report, Truman pitched the flood insurance
program not only as a way to speed the recovery of flood-damaged individuals and
businesses, but also as a method of decreasing the need for future relief payments. “Once
the system of flood insurance is in effect, there should be no need in the future for a
program of partial indemnities such as is now proposed for the Midwest flood victims,”
Truman stated. “As a permanent national policy, insurance is far superior to direct
Federal payments.”120
Response to Truman’s call was mixed. Though it received some support,
representatives of the insurance industry were not sold on its viability. In a hearing on the
matter before the House of Representatives, J. R. Berry, general counsel for the National
Board of Fire Underwriters, expressed deep doubts about the insurability of floods. “My
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guess is that it is not going to be insurance, but it is going to be a subsidy,” he responded
to Mississippi Representative Jamie Whitten’s question about the role of government in
the program. Expanding later on this idea, Berry stated, “(t)hat is why we do not like the
word ‘insurance’ in these bills. We like to think, gentlemen, of insurance companies
paying their obligations and meeting their expenses in full, being self-sustaining, and I
think it will have to be recognized as something other than insurance.”121
After a period of congressional inaction, and still hoping to pass flood insurance
legislation, Truman sent Congress a further statement on flood insurance. “I am sure that
the great majority of the people want to provide in advance out of their own resources for
protection of their property against floods—just as they do now against fire and other
hazards,” Truman wrote. “A Federal system of flood insurance is the logical answer.”122
In this second statement, Truman even included a draft of legislation that he hoped
Congress would pass into law. His statement contained one revealing passage, however,
that indicates he may not have fully understood the finances of flood insurance: “I believe
that this flood insurance program should be set up on a basis that is designed to permit
the Government to break even.”123 Even despite Truman’s added pressure, Congress took
no action on flood insurance during his administration.
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A federally subsidized flood insurance was actually passed into law twelve years
before the creation of the National Flood Insurance Program. In 1956, Congress approved
the Federal Flood Insurance Act.124 The passage of this act became relatively
unimportant, however, when Congress declined to appropriate the funding necessary to
support it. Apparently, some lawmakers had no problem with the concept, but were less
enthusiastic when asked to pay for it. As did the plan that was actually put into action in
1968, the 1956 plan called for a cooperative program between private insurers and the
federal government, in which federal subsidies would carry the private companies
through catastrophic floods. The 1956 act did include a provision to prevent the insurance
of property built counter to local floodplain zoning laws, but the available knowledge of
flooding risks at the time was simply not sufficient to enable this type of zoning in many
places. As they had in 1951, some voices within the insurance industry opposed the flood
insurance enacted by the 1956 legislation on the grounds that it was a subsidy, rather than
true insurance. At the time, some insurance company representatives also questioned the
propriety of the federal government entering an industry that had long been recognized as
a domain of private enterprise, even while acknowledging that private companies could
not offer effective flood insurance.125
The flood insurance legislation that was passed into law in 1968 was originally
proposed a year earlier, as the National Flood Insurance Act of 1967, building off of the
ideas offered by the White and Clawson reports. The Congressional hearings on the
124
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proposed bill reflect the change in mentality that had taken place since Truman called for
a federal flood insurance program some sixteen years earlier. Absent from the 1967
hearings were the protests from the insurance industry that helped sink Truman’s
proposal. A thorough examination of these hearings reveals a few words of caution, but
not a single testimony strongly opposed to the creation of a federal flood insurance
program. Whether directly or indirectly, White’s ideas were reaching the minds of
lawmakers and professionals concerned with reducing the damages caused by marauding
waters. Politicians, representatives of the insurance industry, and laymen supported the
proposed legislation for a number of reasons, several of which are elucidated in the
following paragraphs.
The American Insurance Association, a trade organization for property and
casualty insurance companies, extended its full support for the proposed federally
subsidized flood insurance program. In his testimony before the Senate committee, T.
Lawrence Jones, president of the association, emphasized the program’s emphasis on
modifying the ways people inhabit floodplains when offering his backing. “A very
important feature of the proposed program is the authority which would be granted to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development to develop criteria for more effective
and widespread flood plain regulations,” he stated. Further, Jones believed, “The concept
that flood insurance would eventually be available only in areas where appropriate land
use and control measures have been adopted is essential to the success of a joint industrygovernment insurance program for the efficient and humane handling of financial
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assistance to flood victims.”126 The emphasis on modifying the use of floodplains was not
only in line with White’s ideas, it also provided the insurance industry a powerful
assurance that the proposed program would not simply be a subsidy for reckless property
owners.
Ellie Schill, a homebuilder from New Orleans who represented the National
Association of Homebuilders before the Senate, offered somewhat more qualified support
for the implementation of building restrictions. Initially praising the thinking behind the
restrictions, Schill then added, “(i)t should be recognized, however, that a great deal of
buildable land is open to the possibility of flooding at some time. This program will have
to be very carefully administered to avoid eliminating from development much land that
is highly valuable and otherwise well located for housing.”127 At another point in his
testimony, Schill revealed that the mindset of his organization was not necessarily one
that had much in common with the ideas promoted by people such as Gilbert White, and
embraced in the proposed legislation. Quoting the policy position of the National
Association of Homebuilders, Schill stated, “The burden of natural disasters such as
hurricanes, floods, tornadoes, and earthquakes falls unfairly and unevenly on the affected
community and its citizens.”128
Another rationale used to support the National Flood Insurance Act was that it
would allow victims of floods to support themselves and reduce the need for charity.
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White would certainly have agreed with this justification, given his position that by
employing a diversified approach to alluvial development, the need for emergency relief
could be greatly reduced. The American Red Cross cited this justification in offering its
full support to the creation of a federally subsidized flood insurance program. In
testimony before the Senate, Robert Shea, Vice President of the American National Red
Cross, emphasized his organization’s central mission of providing immediate relief to the
victims of disasters. “(T)he Red Cross makes no attempt to replace all disaster-caused
losses,” Shea stated. “It only provides the assistance to bridge the gap between what the
families need as the result of the disaster and what they can do for themselves by utilizing
resources available to them.”129 Shea noted that those other available resources, such as
Farmer’s Home Administration loans and comprehensive homeowners’ insurance, are
utilized “in the American tradition of helping oneself insofar as possible.”130 Shea viewed
insurance, even federally subsidized insurance, as a tool rather than a handout or a
subsidy, and voiced his unequivocal support of the proposed flood insurance program.
“Such a program,” he stated, “would have the desirable objective of enabling a
homeowner or resident to protect his family against property risks that he cannot
presently insure and thus make available a further shield against crippling disaster
losses.”131
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Hale Boggs, a Democratic representative from Louisiana who was serving at the
time as the House Majority Whip, had been pushing for a federally backed flood
insurance program even before 1967. In his statement to the House committee, Boggs
emphasized the same idea that had been advanced by Shea: empowering people to protect
themselves. “Our people want the opportunity to protect themselves,” Boggs stated.
“They do not want to rely on relief agencies, Government largesse, or charity. They want
to protect themselves and it is up to us to help them do it. Passage of this legislation will
go a long way in helping people to protect themselves against flood disasters.”132
Jones, the insurance industry representative, supplied another reason why the
federal government should become involved in flood insurance: the inability of private
insurers to offer flood insurance without outside help. Unlike industry representatives in
earlier years, however, Jones did not use this as a reason to suggest that private insurers
would want no part of such a program. “It is often said that any insurance can be written
for a proper price,” Jones said. “This, however, gives a distorted meaning to the word
‘insurance.’ When our industry speaks of it, we mean the system by which the premiums
of the many pay for the losses of the few.”133 Two important factors in determining
insurability, Jones noted, are the catastrophic loss potential and the loss frequency.
Residential fires have a high catastrophic loss potential, but their occurrence is relatively
low, which makes urban fire an insurable risk. Car accidents occur with more frequency,
but the potential for catastrophic loss is low, making auto insurance feasible. Among
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those likely to seek flood insurance, both the frequency and the potential for catastrophic
loss are high, leading Jones to classify floods as uninsurable in the open market. By
mandating the purchase of flood insurance among broader sectors of the population,
Jones noted, the risk could be spread more manageably, though he noted that such a
mandate would be of questionable legality, as well as unpopular. Jones made no mention
of the fact that a federally subsidized flood insurance program would spread the risk to a
larger pool, albeit indirectly via the use of tax dollars.
From outside the halls of congress came another rationale for supporting a
federally supported system of flood insurance: reducing spending. Robert Chuoke,
president of the Sunday Morning Coffee Club from Galveston, Texas, wrote a letter in
support of the legislation on behalf of the club to Galveston’s congressman, Jack Brooks.
In the letter, Chuoke emphasized fiscal responsibility. For many years, he noted, the
federal government had been supporting relief efforts after floods while receiving no
remuneration. Even though the flood insurance program would also involve the spending
of federal money, the government would also take in money in the form of insurance
premiums. This was a change that made a lot of sense to Chuoke and his fellow Coffee
Club members.134 Representative Boggs made a related argument, asserting that a
federally directed and subsidized flood insurance program would save money over the
piecemeal relief measures that had characterized the nation’s response to floods in
previous years.
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With the support that was offered so abundantly by numerous testifiers, it should
come as little surprise that the effort that started in 1965 proved to be the one that
successfully enacted a federally supported program of flood insurance. The National
Flood Insurance Program was passed into law as part of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 in a section known as the National Flood Insurance Act of
1968. 135 The bill called for coverage to focus initially on small businesses and dwellings
with four families or less living in them. No insurance was to be extended to properties
built in violation of state or local floodplain zoning ordinances. In 1968, those ordinances
were far from universal, and the bill had an answer to that problem, too: after June 30,
1970, no new coverage was to be provided in any locale that had not adopted ordinances
to prevent building in especially flood-prone areas.136 The bill provided two options for
how the program would be operated. The first option was to provide federal backing to
allow private insurance companies to offer flood insurance. If that plan did not work, or if
private insurers were uninterested in participating, then the federal government was
authorized to run the flood insurance program itself.137 Chapter 3 of the National Flood
Insurance Act, entitled “Coordination of Flood Insurance with Land-Management
Programs in Flood Prone Areas,” is especially reflective of the influence of White and the
BOB task force. This section of the bill dictated that the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development must make the necessary arrangements with other governmental
departments in order to publish, within five years, information on all flood-prone areas of
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the United States. It also authorized the HUD secretary, at his discretion, to purchase
insured properties that had suffered severe flood damage. Once purchased, they would be
kept under federal ownership and used only for purposes consistent with their floodprone location. Finally, chapter three directed the secretary of HUD to encourage state
and local governments to develop land-use regulations that would minimize new
construction in flood-prone areas and encourage effective floodproofing.138
The passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 marked only the
beginning of the National Flood Insurance Program, which continues in existence to the
present day. Since its original enactment, the program has been amended heavily.
Whether or not it advanced the ideas promoted by White in practice is certainly open to
debate. Nonetheless, the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act serves to illustrate
the broadening acceptance of a school of thought pioneered by Gilbert White.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The National Flood Insurance Program was not an overnight success. The initial
buy-in was almost laughable—twenty policies in the program’s first two years of
existence.139 Various pieces of legislation have made major modifications to the program
since its 1968 inception. Even with increased participation in more recent years, the
program has not come anywhere close to eliminating losses caused by unchecked waters,
as the experience of Iowa City, Iowa demonstrates.
Nonetheless, the NFIP’s creation is a powerful sign of the ways that peoples’
attitudes toward flooding, and toward the natural world as a whole, had changed. In
Gilbert White’s 1942 articulation of the eight methods in which people may respond to
the risk of high waters, flood insurance was but one of those methods. In the analysis
presented in Chapter 3, it is not even represented to be the adjustment that White favored
most strongly. As it has been employed in the United States, however, flood insurance is
also an instrument to encourage the increased practice of other methods that White
favored. Without implementing restrictive legal measures, the NFIP has used the offer of
insurance as an incentive to encourage people to modify their behaviors. One of the
adjustments White supported most strongly in his dissertation was zoning. The National
139
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Flood Insurance Program provided a push for both individuals and municipalities in this
regard. Coverage would not be offered for new construction in violation of local
ordinances, and after a grace period, the government would not sponsor any coverage at
all in areas that had not enacted guidelines for building in risky areas.
Buoyed by a steady faith in the abilities of engineers, people in the first decades
of the century assumed that by manipulating the natural environment in just the right
way, they could eliminate unwanted inundations. Even after the confidence in levees was
eroded by the events of 1927, planners initially shifted their focus mainly to other types
of physical modifications such as reservoirs to hold surplus waters and floodways to
channel those waters into innocuous courses. The New Deal’s emphasis on planning was
fertile soil for new ideas to take hold, and it was in the Roosevelt bureaucracy that a
young geographer developed his revolutionary idea that there are times in which
accommodation of nature is the most logical choice. Some three decades later, that
fledgling geographer had become one of the most respected voices in the discussion of
floods, a status that granted his ideas a crucial role in plotting the nation’s response to
high waters in the 1960s.
The changes that took place between the 1920s and 1960s might never have
happened if the federal government had not become deeply involved in managing
riparian bottomlands. For sure, the National Flood Insurance Program would have never
seen the light of day, since it owed its very existence to federal support. Even before that,
however, the focus on controlling nature might never have declined. The folly of relying
solely on physical adjustments was not vividly demonstrated until a thorough system of
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levees had been completed, and that system was only completed with the backing of
Uncle Sam.
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